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INDIGENOUS LANDS AS CULTURAL
PROPERTY: A NEW APPROACH TO
INDIGENOUS LAND CLAIMS
LINDSEY L. WIERSMA
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the last several decades, public awareness of
the plight of indigenous peoples has grown rapidly, but they are still
perhaps the most disadvantaged segment of the world’s population.1
Among the many factors contributing to that ignoble title, indigenous
peoples and their advocates have identified their rights to the lands
they occupy as a key issue.2 Scholars and indigenous peoples
themselves argue that “rights to lands and resources are property
rights that are prerequisites for the physical and cultural survival of
indigenous communities.”3 Both the physical territory and the
perpetuation of land tenure systems developed by those groups are
necessary for the continuation of indigenous societies in their existing
forms. “For many indigenous cultures, continued utilization of
traditional systems for the control and use of territory is essential to
their survival, as well as to their individual and collective well-being.”4
International law currently protects the land rights of indigenous
5
peoples in several ways, the most effective of which are found in the
property rights protection provisions of several human rights

Copyright © 2005 by Lindsey L. Wiersma.
1. Julian Burger, An International Agenda, in STATE OF THE PEOPLES: A GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT ON SOCIETIES IN DANGER 4 (Marc S. Miller ed., 1993).
2. This Note addresses only claims to lands indigenous peoples currently occupy.
Attempts to reclaim or seek restitution for lands of which indigenous peoples have already been
dispossessed are beyond the scope of this Note. For a survey of attempts by indigenous peoples
to regain control over lands of which they have been dispossessed, see Shelby D. Green, Specific
Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245 (2003).
3. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System,
14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 53 (2001).
4. Rudolfo Stavenhagen, Indigenous Peoples: Emerging Actors in Latin America, in
ETHNIC CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 11 (1995).
5. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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6
instruments. Indigenous peoples, however, often have difficulty
proving that they have a cognizable property interest in their
traditional lands, making the human rights instruments futile.
7
Arguing that indigenous lands are the cultural property of indigenous
groups may be a useful way of proving the necessary property
interest.
This Note explores the possibility of bringing together the
divergent fields of indigenous land rights and cultural property to
provide more expansive protection for indigenous lands. The
combination is not a panacea, but it can both demonstrate a property
interest in the land—thereby bringing it within the protection of
human rights treaties—and focus the discussion on the fundamental
interest underlying indigenous land claims: cultural survival. Part I
discusses who indigenous peoples are and why they are searching for
new ways to protect their traditional lands. Part II introduces the idea
of cultural property and the two ways in which it is conceptualized.
Part III applies those cultural property concepts to indigenous land
claims, showing that cultural property can be a useful way of
conceptualizing and demonstrating indigenous land claims.

I. WHO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ARE AND WHY
THEY ARE LOOKING FOR MORE PROTECTION FOR LAND CLAIMS
A. Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Lands, and Their Historical
Treatment
Before delving into the legal protections currently given to
indigenous peoples and their lands, it is important to understand who
indigenous peoples are, what indigenous lands are, and the historical
treatment of both by the Western World. When one hears
8
“indigenous peoples,” the images that first come to mind are often of
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. Indigenous peoples are referred to by a variety of different names in international legal
circles. Other than indigenous, the most common adjective used is tribal. Various authors and
organizations demonstrate a preference for one term or another. For example, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) refers to “tribal populations” and their lands, whereas the UN uses
“indigenous peoples.” Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
Populations and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in the Independent Countries,
June 2, 1959, 107 I.L.O. 1957, art. 11.; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Some terms have different meanings in
different academic disciplines. For example, in anthropology the word “tribe” connotes a
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hunters and gatherers in the Amazonian rainforests or herders on the
African Savannah, but indigenous peoples can be found in at least
seventy-four countries around the world and are estimated to account
9
for 6 percent of the world’s population. Creating a definition of such
a large and diverse group is a difficult task. Although there is no
widely accepted definition of indigenous peoples under international
10
law, many attempts at a definition have been put forward.
At the most basic level, “indigenous peoples are best defined
as . . . groups traditionally regarded, and self-defined, as descendants
of the original inhabitants of lands with which they share a strong,
often spiritual bond.” They “are, and desire to be, culturally, socially
11
and/or economically distinct from the dominant groups in society.”
The International Labor Organization (ILO) laid out one of the
12
13
most widely cited definitions of indigenous peoples. The ILO
created a two-part definition; a group needs to satisfy only one part to
be considered an indigenous people. The first part includes those
“whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them
from other sections of the national community, and whose status is
regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by
special laws or regulations.”14 The second part includes those who are
“descen[ded] from the populations which inhabited the country . . . at
the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present
state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain

specific type of social organization, so an anthropologist would not use “indigenous” and
“tribal” interchangeably. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed., 2001), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/. These organizational preferences and discipline-specific
definitions are generally ignored in the legal literature and will be ignored in this Note.
9. Robert K. Hitchcock, International Human Rights, the Environment, and Indigenous
Peoples, 5 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1994).
10. Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and Transnational
Corporations—Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 331, 346 (1998).
11. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and
International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60 (1999). It is worth noting that all of
these definitions exclude some of the most well-known land disputes, such as the one fueling the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
12. See, e.g., Anaya & Williams, supra note 3, at 56; Wiessner, supra note 11, at 111–12
(citing the ILO definition of indigenous peoples).
13. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
June 27, 1989, 169 I.L.O. 1989, art. 1(1). See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
14. Id. art. 1(1)(a).
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some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
15
institutions.”
16
Defining “indigenous lands” poses similar problems, primarily
in creating a definition that accommodates the variety of uses and
land tenure systems utilized by indigenous peoples. The Brazilian
17
Constitution contains one of the most expansive definitions. It
defines indigenous lands as those used by indigenous peoples in any
of four ways: those “occupied by [indigenous peoples] on a
permanent basis, those used for their productive activities, those
indispensable for the preservation of environmental resources
necessary for their well-being and those necessary for their physical
and cultural reproduction, according to their uses, customs and
traditions.”18

15. Id. at art. 1(1)(b). Although this is the most common definition, other definitions of
indigenous peoples abound. Another commonly cited definition states:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.
Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations
para 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.XIV3 (1986). Similarly,
but not identically, another scholar asserts:
Most definitions agree that indigenous peoples descend from pre-colonial inhabitants,
that they have a close connection to traditional lands and other natural resources, and
that they maintain a strong sense of cultural, social, economic and linguistic identity.
Indigenous peoples include native peoples, tribal peoples, aboriginals, and ‘first
nations.’
John Alan Cohan, Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution,
20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 133, 136 (2001/2002) (citations omitted). Many scholars,
advocates, and experts prefer not to establish a definition of indigenous peoples but to allow for
self-definition, typically with a list of indicia of indigenousness. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury,
“Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy,
92 AM. J. INT’L L. 414, 455 (1998) (listing the following four essential criteria: (1) selfidentification as a distinct ethnic group; (2) experience of or vulnerability to “severe disruption
dislocation or exploitation”; (3) historical connection with the region; and (4) the wish to
maintain an identity as a distinct ethnic group).
16. The lands that indigenous peoples inhabit are called indigenous lands, tribal lands, or
traditional lands. These labels are essentially interchangeable. See supra note 8.
17. Constituicão Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] (Braz.) art. 231, § 1, translated in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL 125 (Gilbert H. Flanz &
Patrice H. Ward eds., 2004).
18. Id.
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Indigenous peoples have been struggling to protect their lands
for centuries. When Europeans began colonizing other parts of the
world, few protections were granted to indigenous peoples and their
lands. John Locke articulated the quintessential European position
on the rights of indigenous peoples: that they had no rights to lands
they did not cultivate.19 Because the land tenure systems of many
indigenous groups did not reflect the cultivation patterns established
20
in Europe, many settlers believed they had free rein to take control
of many indigenous lands.21 The colonizers saw themselves not as
dispossessing indigenous peoples but as creating economic use out of
22
wasted land.
However, not all European scholars were convinced that their
compatriots could deprive indigenous peoples of their land so easily.
Some believed that indigenous Americans were legitimate owners of
23
their traditional lands and argued that “those ambitious European
States which attacked the American Nations and subjected them to
their avaricious rule, in order, as they said, to civilize them, and [to]
have them instructed in the true religion . . . justified themselves by a
pretext equally unjust and ridiculous.”24
These two perspectives, articulated centuries ago, are essentially
the two voices heard in the debate surrounding indigenous land rights
today. Whereas indigenous groups continue to claim that they are the
25
legitimate owners of their traditional lands, dominant groups argue

19. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 102–03 (Prometheus
Books 1986) (1690).
20. Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights
Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363, 365 (1999).
21. SHAUNNAGH DORSETT, Land Law and Dispossession: Indigenous Rights to Land in
Australia, in LAND LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 279, 280–1 (Susan Bright & John Dewar
eds., 1998).
22. Id. at 281.
23. FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES [On the
Indians Lately Discovered] 128 (John Pawley Bate trans., Ernest Nys ed., Oceana Publications
1964) (1557); E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DE GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE,
APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS [THE LAW
OF NATIONS, OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS] 116 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., James Brown
Scott ed., Oceana Publications 1964) (1758).
24. DE VATTEL, supra note 23, at 116.
25. See, e.g., Final Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: In the Case of the Mayagna (Sumo)
Indigenous Community of Awas Tigni Against the Republic of Nicaragua (Unofficial
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that indigenous peoples do not have any rights to land to which they
do not hold title under national law and that indigenous land use
26
should bow to the forces of economic development. When dominant
groups help indigenous peoples secure their land rights, it is often to
27
stimulate economic development for the benefit of the state or to
28
protect the environment, rather than to benefit the indigenous
groups. Although not unchallenged, the Lockean position on the land
rights of indigenous peoples continues to influence the practices of
many governments.29
B. Protection of Indigenous Land Rights Under Domestic Law
Today
In recent decades, activists, legal scholars, and indigenous groups
themselves have challenged the traditional Lockean conception of
indigenous peoples’ property rights. As a result, protection for
indigenous peoples’ lands is generally increasing, but not all efforts to

Translation), 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325, 327 (2002) [hereinafter Final Written Arguments
of the Inter-American Commission].
26. See, e.g., Reply of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Complaint Presented Before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of the Mayagna Community of Awas Tingni
(Submitted Oct. 21, 1998) (Unofficial Translation), 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 120–25
(2002) [hereinafter Reply to Awas Tingni Complaint].
27. Property rights programs have been used in attempts to spur economic growth, on the
theory that people with secure property rights are more likely to invest in improvements on
their land. See, e.g., Jean O. Lanjouw, A Difficult Question in Deed: A Cost-Benefit Framework
for Titling Programs, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 889, 950 (2004) (“There is good reason to believe
that a formal system of property rights can spur economic growth.”) The efficacy of such
programs, however, has been challenged. See, e.g., ANNA KNOX ET AL, Property Rights,
Collective Action, and Technologies for Natural Resource Management: A Conceptual
Framework, in INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: THE ROLE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12, 19 (Ruth
Meinzen-Dick et al eds., 2002) (observing that where indigenous property rights persist, title
does little to strengthen land rights of community members).
28. C.f., e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, UNEP.Bio.Div./CONF. L2.1992, art. 8 (1992) (stating that, “[s]ubject to [their]
national legislation,” the signatories shall “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge,
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity”).
29. See, e.g., Wayne T. Brough & Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Property Rights and the Economic
Development of the Sahel, in THE REVOLUTION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 163, 166–75
(James A. Dorn et al. eds., 1998) (documenting colonial efforts to change land use patterns in
the Sahel); Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 69, 70 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J.
van der Walt eds., 1996) (arguing that the traditional conception “remains powerful and exerts
substantial determinative force in adjudicating and developing the rules of property law”).
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expand protection have been successful. Those countries attempting
to secure indigenous land rights are doing so primarily in two ways.
The first approach is to register and title indigenous lands either to
30
communities as a whole or to certain individuals within the group.
The second approach is to set up a reserve system whereby
indigenous groups do not receive formal title to their lands, but the
lands are demarcated and protected as reserves for the indigenous
groups.31 Neither approach is necessarily preferable to the other
across the board because each country and indigenous group has its
own unique needs and circumstances. Hunters and gatherers that
forage lands also used by other groups might best be served by a
reserve system. Primarily agrarian groups settled in a specific
location, on the other hand, might benefit most from land titling;
some groups might be best served by individual title and other groups
by communal title.
Even in those countries that have been making great strides in
the legal protection of indigenous land rights, actually implementing
those policies has been difficult. In Australia, for example, the courts
made a dramatic about-face from their traditional holding that the
annexation of the continent to the British Empire vested the Crown
with ownership of all lands on the continent, including those
inhabited by indigenous peoples.32 In an effort to implement this new
holding and formalize indigenous groups’ rights to lands that
previously had been believed to have vested in the Crown, the
legislature enacted the Native Title Act to register land titles for
indigenous peoples.33 In interpreting the Native Title Act, the
34
Australian High Court created strenuous qualification requirements.
For example, to receive title, a group must prove that its members are
the direct biological descendants of the original inhabitants, have
maintained a close connection to the land, and live according to
substantially the same customs as their ancestors did at the time of

30. For example, Mozambique allows the registration of land titles in the name of the local
community. Jon D. Unruh, Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions
of Agroforestry Technology Adoption, in INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, supra note 27, at 166, 182.
31. For a survey of approaches taken by countries around the world, see Wiessner, supra
note 11, at 66–92.
32. Milirrpum v. Nabalco, 17 F.L.R. 141, 245 (Sup. Ct. N. Terr. 1971); Mabo v. Queensland
[No.2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 58 (Austl.).
33. Native Title Act, 1993 (Austl.).
34. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 61.
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35

colonization. Thus, the Australian courts first found a legal basis for
indigenous land rights by reinterpreting the effect of Australia’s
annexation to the British Empire, then later curtailed the ability of
indigenous peoples to gain title to their lands under the Native Title
Act.
In 1997, Bangladesh began registering land titles to indigenous
individuals in its Central Highlands, an area historically comprised of
36
communal lands. The program has allowed indigenous farmers to
secure both their land tenure and their livelihood, but less communal
land has meant that poorer members of the indigenous community,
who did not have their own lands to title, have fewer places to gather
37
food and other necessary supplies. Privatization in the Central
Highlands has also contributed to the decline of traditional methods
of helping the poor and indigent, as individual needs have taken new
priority relative to communal needs.38 Despite the best efforts of a
program designed to make indigenous peoples more secure, the
Bangladeshi titling program has contributed to the further
impoverishment of the indigenous poor and the collapse of the
traditional means by which the indigenous society took care of its
needy members.
Despite the considerable difficulties in implementing the
programs in Australia and Bangladesh, many other attempts have
faced even more serious problems. Some countries have passed
laudable new laws only to have deep-seated discrimination on the
part of the dominant group impede implementation.39 In other places,
40
indigenous groups themselves have refused to accept the new system

35. Id.
36. Raja Devasish Roy, Challenges for Juridical Pluralism and Customary Laws of
Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 113, 122 (2004).
37. Id. at 153.
38. Id. at 154.
39. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 84–86 (documenting the difficulties faced by countries such
as Bolivia and Guatemala).
40. In Kenya, for example, the government established group ranches with borders that
conflicted with traditional migration patterns; the Maasai disregarded ranch boundaries and
have continued their traditional, semi-nomadic patterns. Jean Ensminger, Culture and Property
Rights, in RIGHTS TO NATURE: ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND POLITICAL
PRINCIPLES OF INSTITUTIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 179, 193–94 (Susan S. Hanna et al. eds.,
1996). Indigenous peoples in Papua New Guinea responded to a 1995 proposal to register
traditional lands with protests and riots, forcing the initiative to be postponed. Wiessner, supra
note 11, at 91.
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because new land regimes and institutions that do not fit with existing
41
norms are not easily incorporated into indigenous society. Critics
argue that some attempts to secure indigenous land rights are not
actually intended to benefit indigenous peoples; creating a land
tenure system that conflicts with traditional practices can cause
changes in the indigenous society that can be used by governments to
42
force social change within the indigenous group.
Throughout the world, domestic governments are trying to find
43
ways to protect indigenous peoples and their land rights. Many
domestic laws, however, do not give indigenous communities the
protections they purport to ensure.44 Indigenous peoples and their
advocates have accordingly turned to international law for help.
C. Protection of Indigenous Land Claims under International Law
International intergovernmental organizations have tried to
protect indigenous land rights in a variety of ways,45 but those

41. Ensminger, supra note 40, at 183.
42. Joel M. Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies:
Problematic Ideological Issues Raised by Land Registration, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467, 485–86
(2004).
43. See generally Wiessner, supra note 11.
44. Geer, supra note 10, at 387.
45. Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 190
(2001). Indigenous groups also make claims based on political self-determination, historical
sovereignty, minority status, and indigenous status. Id.
Political self-determination is essentially the right of a group to determine the rules by
which it will live; it can mean anything from complete sovereignty as an independent state to the
autonomy of a minority group within a larger state, such as the position of Native American
nations in the United States. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 116. Indigenous groups seeking
sovereignty usually seek to find autonomy within a larger state. Kingsbury, supra at 244. This
self-determination without sovereignty finds little support in international law, Geer, supra note
10, at 385, so it is largely dependent on the dominant group’s willingness to cooperate in the
establishment of such a regime.
An example of a claim based on the historic sovereignty of the group, although not made
by an indigenous group, is Lithuania’s claim that it was never legally annexed to the Soviet
Union and, therefore, never lost its sovereignty. Kingsbury, supra at 234–35. The international
community, however, never fully accepted that argument, and those who did accept it
acknowledged that the rule on which it was based was recently developed. Id. at 235. Claims
based on historic sovereignty typically do not succeed when sovereignty is traced to precolonial
times, because at the time of colonization conquest was a valid means of acquiring territory. See
id. (“[T]here are not necessarily legal implications for groups forcibly incorporated into existing
states in earlier periods.”).
Claims made as minority groups are quite common, and include claims by Native
Americans in the United States seeking affirmative action treatment on the same grounds as
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focusing on human rights claims have proven the most effective,
46
finding acceptance in both domestic and international courts.
Two types of human rights provisions are used: those that protect
47
the right of indigenous peoples to maintain their cultural system and
48
those that protect the right to property. Indigenous peoples have
used the former category by arguing that their cultural system cannot
49
be maintained without securing rights to traditional lands. This
Note, however, focuses on the latter category and the possibility of
using cultural property arguments to establish the requisite property
interest. Protections for property rights themselves fall into two
categories: those with generally applicable property protection

other minorities. Internationally, these claims are most often based on Article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which protects “all those
characteristics necessary for the preservation of their cultural identity” and states that “persons
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members
of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use
their own language.” ICCPR, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The UN Human Rights Committee has
affirmed that enjoyment of this right requires protection of traditional lands, recognizing that
“culture manifests itself in many forms including in a particular way of life associated with the
use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples.” General Comment No. 23
(50), U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., 314th mtg., ¶ 7 U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (1994). However, many indigenous leaders protest simply being
dubbed minorities, believing the term fails to recognize their unique situation. Kingsbury, supra
at 204.
Claims based on indigenous status emphasize the “wrongful deprivation, above all, of
land, territory, self-government, means of livelihood, language and identity.” Id. at 244. For
many, both within and outside indigenous groups, this appeal to history and identity is the
strongest argument indigenous peoples can make, but it is not yet fully supported by
international law. Id. A number of proposed documents following this approach,, if approved,
would essentially create a special subset of human rights applicable only to indigenous peoples.
See, e.g., United Nations Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UDRIP), 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. art. 4, 25–26, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994) (recognizing
the right of indigenous peoples to “own, develop, [and] control” traditional lands); Proposed
American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 133d Sess., Art.
18, OEA/Ser L/V/II.95.doc.7, rev. 1997 (1997) (“Indigenous peoples have the right to the
recognition of their property and ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and
resources they have historically occupied, as well as the use of those to which they have
historically had access for their traditional activities and livelihood.”).
46. Kingsbury, supra note 45, at 202.
47. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 45, at 24.
48. See infra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
49. “Territorial rights are a central claim for Indigenous Peoples around the world. Those
rights are the physical substratum for their ability to survive as peoples, to reproduce their
cultures, and to maintain and develop their productive systems.” Osvaldo Kreimer, Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights to Land, Territories and Natural Resources: A Technical Meeting of the OAS
Working Group, 10 HUM. RTS. BR. 13, 13 (2003).
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provisions and those that specifically protect indigenous property
rights.
Generally applicable provisions may be used to protect the
property rights of indigenous peoples because such provisions protect
the property rights of all people. The most broadly applicable of those
protections is in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The Declaration states simply, “Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others,” and “no one
50
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”
Other international treaties specifically call for the protection of
indigenous peoples’ property rights. For example, one ILO
convention speaks directly to the rights of indigenous peoples, stating,
“The rights of ownership and possession of the [indigenous] peoples
concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be
51
recognized.”

50. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The OAS provides similar protection in its American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man and the American Covenant on Human Rights. American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official Rec., OEA/ser.L/V./II.23, doc.21
rev.6, art. 23 (1948) (giving all peoples the right “to own such private property as meets the
essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the
home”). Read in combination with the American Declaration’s preamble, which states that it is
“the duty of man to preserve, practice and foster culture by every means within his power,” id.
at prmbl., Article 23 can be interpreted to require the recognition of communal lands as well as
individual property rights as a means of preserving and fostering culture, American Convention
on Human Rights, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 21 (entered into
force July 18, 1978). The American Convention is more protective of indigenous land rights
than is the American Declaration, but it also binds fewer states. The Inter-American Court for
Human Rights (IACHR) has held that the nondiscrimination provision in Article 1(1) of the
Covenant requires that Article 21 protect indigenous lands. The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, at 75 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter
Awas Tingni Case].
51. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
supra note 13, art. 14(1). This provision is especially potent for indigenous peoples when framed
by Article 13(1), which provides special protections for cultural and spiritual values related to
land. Id. art 13(1). Convention 169 replaced an earlier version, 107, which called for indigenous
group ownership of traditionally occupied lands. Convention Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous Populations and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in the
Independent Countries, June 2, 1959, 107 I.L.O. 1957, art. 11. Other international organizations
have provided similar protection. The UN specifically addressed indigenous land rights in the
UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. See 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. art. 26,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994) (“Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control
and use the lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters,
coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used.”). The OAS’s Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees
requires states to protect the “lives and property” of their indigenous peoples. Inter-American
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D. Difficulties in Securing Protection for Indigenous Lands under
International Law
Although international human rights law protects property
rights, several hurdles face indigenous groups attempting to secure
land rights under these provisions. The primary difficulty lies in
establishing that their interests in land rise to the level of property
interests. This difficulty derives from basic differences in the
understanding of what constitutes property.52
The term “property,” as used in international treaties and
conventions, has a meaning independent of that in domestic legal
systems, but the exact definition is unclear.53 The traditional Western
model of property, which dominates both international law and the
domestic laws of many countries around the world, centers on the
idea of a single owner holding rights to property to the exclusion of
all others.54 This Western construction of property differs greatly from
that of many indigenous systems, in which property rights, especially
55
those with respect to land, do not vest in individuals but rather in the
community as a whole. “Communal, land-based peoples conceive of
and interpret ownership in ways that are foreign to, and diminished
by, [Western] property regimes.”56 Communal claims not only do not
fit within the traditional Western conception of property,57 but must

Charter of Social Guaranties, Art. 39 (1948), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 432, 433 (Edmund Jan Osmanczyk ed., 1990). The
OAS is also working on the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which would give indigenous peoples wider rights to traditional lands than they
currently enjoy under international law:
(1) Indigenous people have the right to the legal recognition of their varied and
specific forms and modalities of their control, ownership, use and enjoyment of
territories and property. (2) Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of
their property and ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and resources
they have historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which they have
historically had access for their traditional activities and livelihood. . . . (3) . . . (iii)
Nothing. . . shall be construed as limiting the right of indigenous peoples to attribute
ownership within the community in accordance with their customs, traditions, uses
and traditional practices, nor shall it affect any collective community rights over them.
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 45, art. 18.
52. Hutt & McKeown, supra note 20, at 365.
53. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 146.
54. Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 83
(2002).
55. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 120–21.
56. Riley, supra note 54, at 93.
57. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 121.
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also confront the traditional Western belief that communal ownership
58
is economically inefficient. Further compounding the problem,
replacing communal rights with individual rights may frustrate the
adaptive purposes for which the indigenous society developed the
practice.59 The collateral effects of registering individual titles in
Bangladesh’s Central Highlands are a clear example of this. Titling
land increased security for some individual land farmers, but it also
contributed to the collapse of the society’s mechanism for caring for
its poor.60
These conceptual difficulties can be exacerbated by indigenous
land tenure systems that are foreign to Western legal systems.61 For
example, it is common for indigenous groups to engage in practices
that would fail to demonstrate ownership in Western legal systems,
such as migration or overlapping land use with other groups.62 “[S]uch
traditional land and resource use patterns create forms of property
that are recognized and functional within and among indigenous
communities,”63 but which are foreign to, and thus not easily handled
by, the Western legal tradition.
Indigenous peoples and their advocates have forced both
domestic and international legal communities to reevaluate the
protections given to indigenous lands. Although many countries have
attempted to deal with this issue domestically, shortcomings in those
attempts have led indigenous peoples to turn to international human
rights law for protection. Demonstrating that an indigenous group’s
interest in the lands it uses is a property interest has been difficult. In
this effort, the concept of cultural property can be a useful tool to
help indigenous groups establish property interests in their traditional
lands and thereby come within the property protection provisions of
international human rights laws.

58. HENRY G. MANNE, THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 31 (1975). This
argument, based on the tragedy of the commons theory, contends that individuals in a collective
system will misuse land because no one individual bears the full cost of such misuse; the
argument presumes that the use of communal property is uncoordinated. Id. at 30.
59. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 121.
60. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
61. Hutt & McKeown, supra note 20, at 365.
62. Anaya & Williams, supra note 3, at 45.
63. Id. at 43.
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II. CULTURAL PROPERTY
Cultural property is a term often used but not clearly defined.
The basic idea behind it, though, is quite simple: some things are of
such great cultural significance that they deserve special protection
outside of traditional property law.64 A classic example of the
question posed by cultural property is, “Should we allow the owner of
65
a Rembrandt to use it as a dartboard?” Traditional doctrines of
property law say yes, because one of the rights of ownership is the
66
right to destroy the property. Most people, however, cringe at the
idea of the owner of a Rembrandt sitting at home, casually tossing
darts at it. That cringe is the seed that grew into the concept of
cultural property. The idea behind cultural property is that a cultural
treasure, like a Rembrandt, is taken out of the regular property
regime and accorded special treatment to protect and preserve the
item or to ensure its public availability. The special treatment might
involve government ownership of the cultural treasure67 or the
placement of limitations on the owner’s ability to alter, destroy, or
68
transport the item.
Section A will examine the two schools of thought on why
cultural property should be protected, and Section B will then
examine the place of cultural property in international law.
A. The Property and Culture Schools of Cultural Property
Although the basic idea of cultural property is easy to
understand, determining the precise contours of what is protected and
why is substantially more difficult. There are two different schools of
thought on why cultural property is protected: the Property School
69
and the Culture School. These two schools are distinguished by their

64. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 110
(2003).
65. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 10 (1999) (querying whether anyone should “be allowed to
destroy a great artist’s work”).
66. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 772 (2001).
67. SAX, supra note 65, at 185.
68. Id.
69. The names of these schools come from Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting
the “Cultural” and “Property” Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law,
16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1033, 1058–59 (1992–1993). Mastalir, in turn, based his schools on the
two conceptions of cultural property discussed by John Henry Merryman, in Two Ways of
Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 832–33 (1986).
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focus on protecting either the property itself or the culture that values
the property. The Property School emphasizes protecting the item at
issue because of the intrinsic value of the item itself, whereas the
Culture School emphasizes protecting the item for the sake of
70
preserving the culture to which the item is significant. Because they
each justify a cultural property regime differently, they also differ in
what they consider to be cultural property. For that reason, both
schools must be examined in detail.
The debate surrounding the Elgin Marbles—friezes from the
Athenian Parthenon that were removed and that are currently
displayed in the British Museum—provides a relatively clear example
of the difference between the two schools. Greece argues that these
marbles should be returned because they are an important part of
Greek heritage and are valuable because of what they mean to the
71
Greeks. This is the Culture School perspective. The United
Kingdom, meanwhile, argues that the Elgin Marbles should remain in
the museum, where they can be preserved for posterity, rather than
returned to the Parthenon where pollution in the Athenian air would
irreparably damage them.72 The United Kingdom articulates the
Property School. Both schools seek to protect items of cultural
significance, but their motivations for providing this protection differ.
The Property School seeks to protect the item to preserve it so that
all people can enjoy it. The Culture School seeks to protect the item
for the sake of the culture from which it came.
The Property School represents the most conventional
understanding of cultural property; the Rembrandt-as-a-dartboard
example fits within this school. Property School theorists define
cultural property as “property which, on religious or secular grounds,
is . . . of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art
73
or science.” To the Property School, the ultimate purpose of a
cultural property regime is to protect the object itself. Items of

70. Mastalir, supra note 69, at 1062–63.
71. See Neal Ascherson, End Exile: For 300 Years We Have Had the Elgin Marbles, but the
Case for Their Return Is Now Unanswerable, THE OBSERVER (London), June 20, 2004, at
Review Pages 5 (recounting the history of the Elgin Marbles and the debate currently
surrounding them).
72. Id.
73. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer
of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, 234 [hereinafter UNESCO
1970].
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cultural property contribute to a “common human culture” and thus
are the heritage of all humankind.75
Because the Property School protects culturally significant items
as the heritage of all, its primary concern is preserving and
disseminating cultural property so that it can be enjoyed by future
generations. An individual may own an item of cultural property, but
the rights of ownership should be limited to protect, and ensure
76
public access to, the object. In the Elgin Marbles example, the
United Kingdom argues that the primary concern should be
protecting the Marbles so that they can be viewed and valued by
people throughout the world and by future generations.77 Although
the Property School recognizes that “[s]eparated from its context . . .
78
the object and the context both lose significance,” if the proper
preservation and dissemination of the object requires that it be
removed from its original context, the concerns of preservation and
dissemination prevail.79 Thus, the United Kingdom recognizes that the
Elgin Marbles lose something by being in a museum rather than on
the Pantheon, but believes that such loss is outweighed by the benefit
of preserving the Marbles.80
On the other side, the Culture School argues that culturally
significant items should be protected for the benefit of the society to
which they belong. A central tenet of the Culture School is that
“physical objects and other resources can be critical to human
attempts to construct cultures, preserve memories, inspire wonder,
embody aspirations, and ultimately understand—in some way—the
81
place of individuals in the human and natural worlds.” The Culture
School recognizes that certain items are important to a group’s sense
of identity.82 Rather than protecting culturally significant items for the

74.
75.
76.
policy).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Merryman, supra note 69, at 831.
Id. at 853.
See id. (arguing that preservation is the most important element of cultural property
Id. at 358.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
Id.
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 64, at 116.
Mastalir, supra note 69, at 1039.
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sake of the items themselves, the Culture School seeks to protect
83
them for the benefit of the groups to which they are significant.
The central distinction between the Property School and the
Culture School lies in what they are trying to protect and for whom
they are protecting it. The Property School seeks to protect cultural
products that are important in art, history, or science for the benefit
of all humankind. The Culture School seeks to protect items for the
benefit of the group from which they come.
B. Cultural Property in International Law
Although cultural property is often regarded as a new
84
development in property theory, it has had an established place in
international law for more than half a century. The first treaty on
cultural property, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict85 (Hague 1954), was
intended to protect cultural property, particularly monumental
86
buildings, in times of war.
After establishing protection for cultural treasures during armed
conflict, attention turned to the regulation of trafficking in cultural
property. United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural
Organization Convention (UNESCO 1970) was created to oppose the
“impoverishment of cultural heritage” through illicit trade in cultural
87
property. In UNESCO 1970, the states parties agreed to prevent the
importation of cultural property traded contrary to the laws of the
country of origin and to return illicit items found within their borders
to their countries of origin.88 The determination of what constituted
cultural property and how to protect it was left up to the states, which
89
responded in one of four ways: blanket prohibitions on exchanges of

83. See id. at 1046 (“In a sense, it is the culture that is being preserved at the expense of the
property by this form of protection.”).
84. SINGER, supra note 66, at 770.
85. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague 1954].
86. Mastalir, supra note 69, at 1047.
87. UNESCO 1970, supra note 73, art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236.
88. Id. arts. 7, 9, 13, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 242, 244. Although UNESCO is important in the
development of the international law of cultural property, its impact is muted by the fact that
only two major market countries are party to the UNESCO 1970 agreement, the United States
and Canada. Merryman, supra note 69, at 843.
89. Mastalir, supra note 69, at 1052–53 (citing JOHN H. MERRYMAN AND ALBERT E.
ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 53 (4th ed. 2003)).
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90
91
cultural property, prohibitions on the export of designated objects,
92
export license regimes in which licenses are routinely granted, and
leaving cultural property exportation unrestricted.93
UNESCO 1970 arguably advances the Culture School goals of
protecting cultural integrity because it leaves the determination of
how to handle cultural property and the return of illicit items to their
countries of origin up to each individual country. Critics of the treaty,
however, have articulated arguments that echo Culture School
concerns. UNESCO 1970 is criticized for its focus on the legitimacy of
property rights to cultural property rather than concern for the
integrity of the cultures from which the property comes.94 Another
criticism is that giving a state the power to designate what will be
protected as cultural property will likely protect items significant to
the group that controls the government, but it may not protect items
significant to minority indigenous groups. Rather than allowing
indigenous groups to decide which objects and places are important
to them and thus deserve protection, the significance of those objects
and places is judged by the government, on the basis of values
external to the group for whose cultural integrity they are important.95
Cultural property may be foreign to many, particularly to those
in the Western legal tradition, but it is based on a shared desire to
protect culturally significant items and enjoys an established position
96
in international law.

III. A CULTURAL PROPERTY ARGUMENT FOR INDIGENOUS LAND
RIGHTS
Indigenous peoples seeking protection for their traditional lands
under international human rights conventions have had difficulty
demonstrating that their traditional lands are in fact their property.97
Because these difficulties arise from fundamental differences between
98
indigenous practices and the dominant legal regime, new “strategies

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

This is the route adopted by Mexico and Guatemala. Id. at 1052.
Italy and France exemplify this approach. Id.
Great Britain and Canada followed this route. Id.
The United States opted for this approach. Id. at 1052–53.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1042 (critizing UNESCO 1970 for this reason).
See id. at 1047–58 (documenting the development of cultural property law since 1954).
See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53–63 and accompanying text.
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for the protection of [traditional] land rights of indigenous peoples
99
must be found.” Treating indigenous lands as cultural property
might be just such a strategy.
The concept of cultural property has had an established place in
international law for more than half a century.100 The international
law of cultural property, however, largely developed to control the
101
transport of items of cultural significance. Thus far, international
cultural property laws have focused on preventing foreigners from
102
destroying cultural property and controlling the transfer of cultural
property across borders,103 leaving states to control domestic use as
they see fit. The problem of indigenous land rights, however, springs
from domestic governments’ failure to protect indigenous groups’
rights to the lands they occupy. It is the domestic treatment of
indigenous lands that is of primary concern, but international cultural
property treaties do not control domestic use.
Although existing international laws specific to cultural property
cannot protect indigenous lands, the overarching concept of cultural
property can and should inform the understanding of the “property”
protections afforded by international human rights law. Because the
meaning of “property” under international law is independent of its
104
meaning under domestic laws, and because that independent
meaning remains unclear, cultural property concepts can be useful in
developing that definition in a way beneficial to indigenous groups.
By establishing that indigenous lands, like valuable works of art,
should be protected under a regime of cultural property, indigenous
peoples can bring their claims under the international human rights
conventions protecting property rights.
The efficacy of such an argument, and the framing of it, depends
on which conception of cultural property one adopts. Section A of
this Part examines what that argument would look like from the
Property School view; Section B examines it from the Culture School

99. Geer, supra note 10, at 336–37.
100. The first international convention on cultural property entered into force in 1954 and
protected buildings such as cathedrals and museums in times of war. Hague 1954, supra note 85,
249 U.N.T.S. at 240.
101. See, e.g., UNESCO 1970, art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236 (restricting the import and export
of cultural property).
102. See, e.g., Hague 1954, supra note 85, 249 U.N.T.S. at 240.
103. See, e.g., UNESCO 1970, supra note 73, art. 2, 823 U.N.T.S. at 236 (prohibiting
unauthorized sales of cultural property).
104. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, at 14.
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view. Section C introduces a case study to examine an indigenous
land claim through three different lenses: traditional property law, the
Property School, and the Culture School.
A. The Property School Applied to Indigenous Lands
The goals of the Property School, the preservation and
dissemination of culturally significant items that are part of a common
105
human heritage, generally call for items to be expertly cared for and
made available to all people. Cultural property is protected by the
Property School because products of cultures, whether paintings,
sculptures, manuscripts, or buildings, are a manifestation of the
human experience, and as such are important in art, history, and
science.
Indigenous lands themselves are not the product of culture and
so do not fit within these goals. The land on which a group resides
shapes the way in which that group adapts to its environment and
may bear the marks of that group (such as fences erected between
agricultural lands or plants and animals brought in by the group), but
the land itself was there before the group arrived and will be there
after the group leaves. It is part of the always changing environment
in which a group resides, but it is not itself the product of that group.
This seemingly prevents land from being cultural property under the
Property School.
However, the way in which an indigenous group lives, such as its
social organization and its adaptation to the environment—the very
culture that from which the property comes—constitutes “an
106
alternative construction of the world” that can and should be
shared. The group’s access to and use of its traditional lands must be
secured to protect that group and the way in which it lives. The
Property School should consider culture, the most profound
manifestation of the human experience, entitled to protection. As
important as artifacts can be to a group’s collective identity, the land
that an indigenous group inhabits is more significant. Aside from
historical and religious sites that may be located on indigenous lands,
indigenous groups have adapted to their environment. Forcing
relocation, or even simply a change in the use of the natural resources

105.
106.

See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
Kreimer, supra note 50, at 14 (quoting Azelene Inacio-Kaingang).
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in an area, can have a dramatic impact on the people affected.
Protecting rights to traditional lands is fundamental to the protection
of indigenous cultures themselves. In an indigenous land claim, then,
the thing to be protected for posterity is not a painting or an artifact,
but the indigenous group’s way of life.
Although protection for indigenous lands under the Property
School satisfies the goals of the Property School (the preservation and
dissemination of those things that reflect the various ways in which
people construct the world), it does so for reasons antithetical to the
goals of the indigenous peoples seeking protection. The Property
School seeks to protect cultural property as the common inheritance
108
of humankind. The concern is not with the group whose culture is
expressed in it, but with the harm suffered by the rest of the world if it
is deprived of the opportunity to enjoy and learn from the culture. In
the case of indigenous lands, this creates a fundamental problem; the
protection is not intended to benefit the indigenous group, but rather
enriches the rest of the world by preserving the indigenous system.
The indigenous group thus loses a measure of control. It is no longer
the beneficial recipient of protection, but rather is protected merely
for the benefit of others. Some indigenous peoples have expressed
their intent to resist any “commercialization” and exploitation of
their cultures by refusing to sell artifacts or license their symbols for
other nonindigenous uses,109 a sentiment that would likely be felt even
more strongly if traditional lands and the way of life associated with
those lands were protected purely for the benefit of others.
Applying Property School ideas to indigenous land claims could
cause problems far beyond indignity: the autonomy of indigenous
groups may also be threatened. Outside groups would be empowered
to determine arbitrarily which lands are protected and to what
110
extent.

107. EMILIO F. MORAN, HUMAN ADAPTABILITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 56–57 (2d ed. 2000). For a dramatic example of the disastrous effects that
well-intentioned development projects can have on indigenous people, see Brough & Kimenyi,
supra note 29, at 175.
108. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2003–04) (describing the tension within the Native American
community over the use of tribal symbols and stories outside the tribe).
110. See Mastalir, supra note 69, at 1042 (criticizing UNESCO 1970 because it allows
domestic governments, not indigenous groups themselves, to determine which items deserve
protection as cultural property).
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Carried further, indigenous groups might be converted into
111
“living museums,” forced to keep their society artificially static for
the benefit of those who wish to observe the culture.112 Cultures are
not static; they are constantly adapting to changes in the environment
113
and reflecting decisions made by the people who create them.
Forcing a society to artificially freeze itself at a moment in time so
that it can be preserved and studied takes away the autonomy and
control which securing indigenous land rights is intended to ensure.
Although the Property School approach can theoretically protect
indigenous land rights, doing so would grant those rights to
indigenous peoples only for the benefit of the rest of the world. The
basic presumptions underlying this type of cultural property argument
deny indigenous peoples the dignity and autonomy that legal rights to
traditional land are intended to secure. Rightfully, indigenous peoples
“are determined to be part of this world as viable communities—
indeed, as self-determining peoples—and not to be relegated to
histories of conquest or pre-modernity, or to be among the objects of
114
tourists’ voyeurism.”
B. The Culture School Applied to Indigenous Lands
The Culture School concerns itself with the integrity and wellbeing of the group: culturally significant items are protected as a
means to that end.115 These goals are furthered by protecting
indigenous lands because “rights to lands and resources are property
rights that are prerequisites for the physical and cultural survival of
indigenous communities.”116
The principles underlying the Culture School are aligned with
the desires of most indigenous peoples, making the application of the
cultural property argument to land rights surprisingly straightforward.
Under the Culture School, the indigenous peoples themselves, rather

111. Wiessner, supra note 11, at 127.
112. Forcing a group to maintain its way of life precisely as it is may be an extreme result,
but there are examples of indigenous groups copying artifacts and designs from neighboring
groups to capitalize on the trendiness of another group’s work or to take advantage of programs
designed to benefit particular indigenous groups. G. Nasieku Tarayia, The Legal Perspectives of
the Maasai Culture, Customs, and Traditions, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183, 185–86 (2004).
113. MORAN, supra note 107, at 56–57.
114. S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The Move
Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 13 (2004).
115. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116. Anaya & Williams, supra note 3, at 53.
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than all of humanity, are the beneficial recipients of the protection
given to cultural property. Indigenous lands are the property of the
indigenous peoples who occupy them not just because those
117
indigenous people are there, but because that land has been
important in shaping the group and is important to the group’s past,
present, and future identity.
C. The Awas Tingni: A Case Study
The Awas Tingni case is a real-world case study in the usefulness
of applying cultural property concepts to indigenous land claims. This
Section will examine that case, first by looking at how it would be
resolved under traditional property law, then through the lenses of
the Property and Culture Schools.
The Awas Tingni is an indigenous community on the Atlantic
118
coast of Nicaragua. Nicaragua’s formal legal regime for recognizing
indigenous lands is one of the most progressive in the Americas.119
Despite this, every time that the leaders of the Awas Tingni group
attempted to secure title to their lands, the government rejected their
application on several grounds.120 One of the reasons the Awas Tingni
were not able to title their land was because the government was not
satisfied with the group’s ability to prove that it had been on that land
as an independent entity at the time of colonization, a requirement
121
for titling land to an indigenous group under Nicaraguan law. The
government also objected to the size of the hunting grounds claimed
(it was a fifteen-day walk across their hunting grounds)122 and to the
fact that their hunting grounds overlapped with lands claimed by
123
other indigenous groups.
Nicaragua argued that all untitled land was the property of the
124
The Nicaraguan government had a policy of leaving
state.
“corridors” of state-owned land between areas titled to indigenous
117. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 151.
118. Id. para. 103(a).
119. S. James Anaya, The Awas Tingni Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect in Nicaragua, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 157, 158 (1996).
120. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 105.
121. See id. (describing the government’s argument that the group’s possession was not
ancestral).
122. Final Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission, supra note 25, at 331.
123. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 141.
124. Reply to Awas Tingni Complaint, supra note 26, at 121–22.
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groups for future infrastructure projects; the land the Awas Tingni
125
claimed fell into such a corridor. Relying on this policy and the
untitled status of the land, the government issued a logging
concession that included a portion of the area the Awas Tingni
claimed as their traditional land.126
127
After exhausting domestic legal remedies, the Awas Tingni
brought their case to the Inter-American Court for Human Rights
(IACHR), part of the Organization of American States. The Awas
Tingni filed their claim under Article 21 of the American Convention
on Human Rights (American Convention), which contains a general
provision for the protection of private property.128 Members of the
Awas Tingni community argued that the Nicaraguan government, in
granting the logging concession, had deprived the community of its
property.129 Nicaragua argued that because the Awas Tingni had not
secured title to the land and because the land was part of a “corridor”
the government had set aside between lands claimed by other
indigenous groups, the land belonged to the state. Therefore, the
130
Awas Tingni’s private property rights had not been violated.
When analyzed under the traditional Western property regime,
the result likely favors Nicaragua. Although the definition of property
under international law is independent of any domestic definitions, in
a case in which an established domestic system allocating ownership
of land already exists, that domestic law can be applied by the
131
tribunal. The Awas Tingni did not have title to their land, thus they
were not the legal owners under Nicaraguan law. Because the state of
Nicaragua owned the land under domestic law, a tribunal applying
traditional property principles would have affirmed the logging
concession.

125. Id. at 102.
126. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 103.
127. Complaint of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Submitted to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in the Case of the Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous
Community Against the Republic of Nicaragua, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 17, 34–35
(2002)[hereinafter Awas Tingni Complaint].
128. American Convention, supra note 50, art 21.
129. Awas Tingni Complaint, supra note 127, at 23
130. Reply to Awas Tingni Complaint, supra note 26, at 121–122.
131. The Awas Tingni case was the first time an international tribunal upheld a group’s
collective land and natural resource rights after the domestic government failed to do so. S.
James Anaya & Claudio Grosman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the
International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2002).
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Applying the Property School of cultural property, the logging
concession would be invalidated and the Awas Tingni would receive
continued access to the land. The Property School would protect the
Awas Tingni’s land not for the benefit of the Awas Tingni, but for the
benefit conferred upon the rest of humanity by allowing the Awas
Tingni to continue living on their land. These benefits include the
opportunity to see how the Awas Tingni organize themselves, how
they survive in their environment, and how they understand the
world. This may or may not result in granting the Awas Tingni legal
ownership of the land. For example, instead of granting the Awas
Tingni title, the government could continue to own the land, but with
restrictions placed on its ability to dispose of the land or the resources
132
on it. In a sense, the government would be holding the land in trust
for all humanity to ensure the survival of the Awas Tingni. The
government, then, might have the power to regulate what the Awas
Tingni could do with the land in the future. Should the Awas Tingni
decide to assimilate into the dominant culture, the government could
have the power to regulate how they use the land, effectively
preventing the assimilation.133
The Awas Tingni, however, sought ownership of the land and the
autonomy that comes with such ownership. Their access to the land is
secured by the Property School, but not their autonomy over it.
Under the Property School, the Awas Tingni end up with but a partial
victory, and for reasons that might ultimately do more harm than
good.
Applying Culture School conceptions of cultural property, the
Awas Tingni lands would be recognized as cultural property because
of their importance to the group. The community’s culture developed
in response to the environment, and its sacred places are on that land.
Indeed, the group’s very way of life and survival as a distinct group
would be imperiled if it were forced to leave its traditional lands or if
those lands were fundamentally changed, such as by the logging of the
forest. Because of its cultural importance to the Awas Tingni, the
land must be regarded as their property, accompanied by formal
ownership of the land and all the rights that go with it, including the

132. See John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 339, 355 (arguing that preservation is an essential element of cultural property policy).
133. This could be a problem any time indigenous lands are protected for ecological reasons.
The resulting difficult balancing of the interests of the indigenous group with environmental
concerns is beyond the scope of this Note.
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right to determine how the land will be used. This is the exact result
that the Awas Tingni sought when they brought their case to the
IACHR. Furthermore, the result is reached for the reason the Awas
Tingni wanted title to the land: to preserve their way of life for their
own benefit.
The IACHR employed arguments reminiscent of the Culture
School in holding that the Awas Tingni did have a property right in
134
the land that was protected by the American Convention, although
it did not make the cultural property argument in so many words.
Although the Awas Tingni did not have official title to the lands they
occupied, they were entitled to ownership of the lands due in part to
the land’s importance to the group’s cultural legacy and the land’s
role in helping the Awas Tingni maintain itself in future
generations.135 The court held that the protection of property in
136
Article 21 of the American Convention includes protection of the
communal property of indigenous groups, including lands, waters,
and forests traditionally belonging to the group.137 Such communal
138
property is inalienable and inextinguishable. In a resounding victory
for indigenous communities, the IACHR made clear that in most
cases mere possession by an indigenous group should be enough for
official recognition and registration of the land.139 Given these
considerations, the court determined that the members of the Awas
Tingni community had communal property rights to the lands they
inhabited. Accordingly, the court ordered Nicaragua to pay
damages140 to the Awas Tingni and to establish a system to demarcate
communal lands that protected land and natural resource rights.141
For several reasons, the Awas Tingni decision was a landmark
for indigenous groups. First, the IACHR interpreted Article 21 in a
way that “avoid[ed] the discrimination of the past and, rather than
excluding indigenous modalities of property, it embrace[d] them,

134. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, para. 148.
135. Id. para 148. The IACHR began its decision by acknowledging that “relations to the
land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual element
which [the Awas Tingni] must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it
to future generations.” Id.
136. American Convention, supra note 50, art. 21.
137. Awas Tingni Case, supra note 50, paras. 148–150.
138. Id. para. 150.
139. Id. para. 151.
140. Id. paras. 167–71.
141. Id. para. 164.
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marking a new path for understanding the rights and status of the
142
world’s indigenous peoples.” Second, “Awas Tingni prove[d] that
well-settled legal principles can give way to indigenous people’s fight
for survival, even when human rights and Western property regimes
conflict.”143 The IACHR did not intentionally apply Culture School
principles, but its reasoning nonetheless reflected those principles and
demonstrated that they can work to both establish property rights and
support the goals of the indigenous movement.
This case study illustrates that employing traditional models of
property and cultural property models to indigenous land claims can
have opposite results. Furthermore, whether cultural property ideas
are applied from the Property School perspective or the Culture
School perspective also can affect the long-term outcome. In the short
term, both schools protected the Awas Tingni’s rights to use and
control its traditional lands; however, the differences in the goals of
the two schools resulted in long-term differences as to who benefited
from protection and how. The Culture School produced results that
aligned with the goals of indigenous peoples because they were the
beneficial recipients of the protection and because the autonomy and
control that they sought over indigenous lands was secured.
CONCLUSION
The world’s indigenous peoples have long struggled to maintain
their separate existence. The fight for access to their traditional lands
is a central element of that struggle; it is a fight that must be won to
ensure their continued economic, social, cultural, and even physical
survival. In the last few decades, a growing number of nonindigenous
people from around the world have stood alongside indigenous
people in this struggle. Although this assistance has made a world of
difference for some indigenous groups, the inability of Western legal
concepts to deal with the problems of indigenous peoples, both under
domestic and international law, has crippled attempts to secure
indigenous land rights.
The primary difficulty for indigenous groups has been in
establishing property rights in their land that would trigger the
property rights protection provisions in international human rights
treaties. Applying the concept of cultural property to indigenous

142.
143.

Anaya & Grosman, supra note 131, at 15.
Riley, supra note 54, at 83.
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lands can help indigenous groups prove a property interest in their
lands and work within these treaties.
When done under the Culture School of cultural property,
treating indigenous lands as cultural property also helps focus the
discussion on what indigenous peoples are really fighting for—
cultural survival. Framing indigenous land claims in Culture School
arguments would not only establish a cognizable property interest
and trigger property rights protections, but it would also refocus the
debate surrounding indigenous land claims on the issue most
important to indigenous groups—securing control over their own way
of life.

